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Previous research has shown that the identification of
visual objects can rely on both view-dependent, holistic
as well as view-independent, analytic representation,
depending on visual attention. Here, we asked whether
the initial conscious detection of objects reveals similar
dependencies and may therefore share similar
perceptual mechanisms. We used continuous flash
suppression to render objects presented in familiar
views invisible at the beginning of a trial and recorded
the time these target objects needed to break into
awareness. Target objects were preceded by spatially
attended or unattended primes that were either shown
in the same familiar view as the targets or horizontally
split (i.e., with their halves swapping positions) in order
to disrupt holistic processing. Relative to an unprimed
baseline, suppression times were shorter for all priming
conditions. Although spatial attention enhanced this
priming effect on access to awareness, even unattended
primes facilitated awareness of a related target,
indicating that object detection does not fully concur
with the idea of attention-demanding analytic object
representations. Moreover, priming effects were of
similar strength for primes shown in the same familiar
view as the targets and for horizontally split primes,
indicating that holistic (template-like) representations do
not play an integral role in object detection. These
results suggest that the initial detection of an object
relies on representations of object features rather than
holistic representations used for recognition. The
perceptual mechanisms mediating conscious object
detection are therefore markedly different from those
underlying object identification.
Introduction
Visual perception of objects involves a hierarchy of
processing stages, from initial image segmentation and
conscious object detection to object categorization,
identiﬁcation, and naming. Much work has been
carried out on the perceptual mechanisms underlying
the more advanced levels of this hierarchy, with a focus
on object recognition in particular. One particular
question attracted much research in the last 25 years:
Given that an object can cast dramatically different
two-dimensional (2-D) images on the retina when seen
in different views, are the memory representations
underlying view constancy also based on stored 2-D
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representations (e.g., Bu¨lthoff & Edelman, 1992; Tarr,
1995)? The idea of holistic (all-in-one-piece) view-based
representation would ﬁt data showing that recognition
performance decreases when objects are rotated from
familiar views (for reviews, see Hummel, 2013; Peissig
& Tarr, 2007). Alternatively, objects may be repre-
sented analytically (meaning that attributes such as
parts and their spatial relations are independent from
each other) and stored as more abstract collections of
generalized three-dimensional (3-D) parts, which allow
the identiﬁcation of an object from any 2-D image, and
therefore independently of viewpoint (Biederman,
1987; Hummel & Biederman, 1992). Recently, re-
searchers seem to agree that the brain uses both view-
dependent as well as analytic representations, with at
least one inﬂuential theory claiming that analytic
representations are only established when objects have
received spatial attention (Hummel, 2001).
To investigate whether object recognition is mediat-
ed by such a hybrid representation that can be both
view- and part-based, which in turn depends on the
allocation of attention, Thoma, Hummel, and Davidoff
(2004) used a short-term priming paradigm with yoked
prime and probe displays. In the prime displays two
objects were shown brieﬂy to the left and the right of
ﬁxation, with only one object receiving the participants’
attention by visually precueing the side it appeared on.
In a subsequent probe display a single target object
shown in a familiar view had to be identiﬁed, which was
the previously attended, the unattended, or an unre-
lated object (to establish the baseline for recognition).
Thoma and colleagues (2004) found that attended
objects produced reliable priming even when the prime
object was shown in a different view, that is, conﬁg-
urally distorted (‘‘split,’’ see Figure 1a). In contrast,
unattended objects produced reliable priming only
when they were repeated in the same (familiar) view.
These and similar ﬁndings with objects rotated in the
picture plane (Thoma & Davidoff, 2006; Thoma,
Davidoff, & Hummel, 2007) are in line with predictions
of the hybrid model of object recognition by Hummel
(2001) proposing that when objects are attended, they
are not only encoded in their seen viewpoint (as is
automatically the case for unattended objects), but also
as an ensemble of parts and spatial relations (also
known as analytic representations, Hummel & Bieder-
man, 1992; or as structural descriptions, Biederman,
1987; Marr & Nishihara, 1978). The hybrid model
Figure 1. (a) Example stimuli. (b) Schematic of an example trial. In the priming period, stimuli were presented binocularly, and
participants covertly named the cued object. In the b-CFS period, participants localized a target object that was initially rendered
invisible through interocular suppression.
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therefore not only explains previous apparently con-
tradictory ﬁndings on view-dependency (for a review,
see Peissig & Tarr, 2007; Thoma & Davidoff, 2007) but
also generates novel predictions, for example, on
priming effects after scaling (Stankiewicz & Hummel,
2002) and depth rotations (Thoma & Davidoff, 2006).
While these studies support a hybrid model for
object recognition (what object is it?), much less is
known about the perceptual mechanisms underlying
the initial conscious detection of an object in the visual
ﬁeld (is an object there?) and how they depend on
attention. The initial conscious detection of an object is
usually assumed to precede recognition (Nakayama,
He, Shimojo, 1995) and to depend less on top-down
inﬂuences such as prior knowledge (Theeuwes & Van
der Burg, 2007). However, there is some evidence that
object detection and recognition can happen at the
same time (Grill-Spector & Kanwisher, 2005), indicat-
ing that detection and recognition may share similar
perceptual mechanisms. More recent work, by contrast,
has supported the traditional view of detection
preceding recognition, with distinct mechanisms guid-
ing detection and recognition (Mack & Palmeri, 2010).
For example, Mack, Gauthier, Sadr, and Palmeri
(2008) showed that degrading the image of an object
has a stronger effect on recognition than on detection.
However, to our knowledge no study has directly
looked at whether object detection—rather than object
recognition—is modulated by attention and by view-
changes. Answering this question will advance our
understanding of the nature of the initial processing
stages in visual object perception and clarify to what
extent the simple detection of an object is inﬂuenced by
top-down processes. If detection and object recognition
rely on similar processes, then we would expect similar
effects of attention and view-changes on priming of
object detection as have been found for priming of
object identiﬁcation (Thoma et al., 2004).
To measure priming effects in simple detection, we
presented objects under strong interocular suppression
induced by continuous ﬂash suppression (CFS; Tsu-
chiya & Koch, 2005). In CFS, a high-contrast pattern
mask ﬂashed into one eye can render a photograph of
an object presented to the other eye invisible for several
seconds (Figure 1b). The time it takes for a target
object to overcome CFS and break into awareness
represents a highly sensitive measure of stimulus
detectability (Jiang, Costello, & He, 2007) that opens a
unique window into the perceptual processes at the
transition to conscious perception (Gayet, Van der
Stighel, & Paffen, 2014; Stein, Hebart, & Sterzer, 2011;
Stein & Sterzer, 2014). Recently, this breaking-CFS
paradigm (b-CFS; Stein, Hebart, & Sterzer, 2011) has
been used to reveal previously unknown stimulus- and
observer-related factors that determine access to
awareness for complex naturalistic objects (for a
review, see Gayet et al., 2014). For example, suppres-
sion times are shorter for familiar photographs of faces
(Gobbini et al., 2013) and for faces and human bodies
presented in their familiar upright orientation (Jiang et
al., 2007; Stein, End, & Sterzer, 2014; Stein, Peelen, &
Sterzer, 2011; Stein, Sterzer, & Peelen, 2012; Zhou,
Zhang, Liu, Yang, & Qu, 2010). Moreover, break-
through into awareness can be facilitated by actively
retaining target-related information in working mem-
ory (Gayet, Paffen, & Van der Stighel, 2013; Pan, Lin,
Zhao, & Soto, 2014) and by priming from prior,
consciously accessible information related to the
suppressed target (Costello, Jiang, Baartman,
McGlennen, & He, 2009; Lupyan & Ward, 2013).
Thus, b-CFS represents a powerful device for measur-
ing the inﬂuence of priming on the initial conscious
detection of naturalistic objects.
In the present study, we used b-CFS to measure the
inﬂuence of attention on analytic and holistic process-
ing in object detection. We recorded suppression times
for target objects presented in familiar views that were
preceded by two brieﬂy presented visible object primes,
one of which was spatially precued (attended) and one
of which was uncued (unattended). A prime object was
either intact (shown in the same familiar view as the
target object) or horizontally split (with its halves
swapping positions, see Figure 1a). Thus, we used the
same attention and prime stimulus manipulations that
have been shown to inﬂuence object identiﬁcation in a
way predicted by the hybrid theory of object recogni-
tion (Thoma et al., 2004). Importantly, splitting an
object image is more than a view change such as
rotating an object in the picture plane or in depth. A
split image cannot be fully matched to a potential
holistic (view-like) representation in memory, as it is by
deﬁnition not a view (Hummel, 2001; Ullman & Basri,
1991). At the same time, a split image would still be
recognizable by part-based representations as proposed
by Biederman and colleagues (Biederman, 1987;
Hummel & Biederman, 1992). Please note that the
degree to which splitting interferes with holistic
processing depends on the deﬁnition of holistic
processing. Here, we use the term to refer to global
template matching, adopting the deﬁnition by Hummel
and colleagues, as the current approach was motivated
by Hummel’s (2001) hybrid model. On other accounts,
splitting an object does not necessarily abolish all
holistic processing, because certain feature conﬁgura-
tions are preserved in split images.
On the basis of recent studies showing that priming
shortens suppression times (Costello et al., 2009;
Lupyan & Ward, 2013), we expected primed objects,
relative to unprimed objects, to have an advantage in
gaining access to awareness. Moreover, if this beneﬁcial
effect of prior information on visual awareness
depended on the observers’ top-down set (Gayet et al.,
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2013) and attentional focus, we would expect stronger
priming effects from spatially attended objects. Finally,
if similar mechanisms supported the detection and the
recognition of objects, we would expect priming from
intact objects irrespective of whether they are attended
or unattended. In contrast, split objects should produce
priming (albeit less than intact primes) only when
attended (Thoma et al., 2004), reﬂecting the attentional
demands of analytic, part-based object processing as




Thirty volunteers (22 female, age range 19–29 years,
mean age 22.5 years, SD¼ 2.7 years), all students
recruited through the Charite´ University Hospital
subject pool, participated in the experiment for
payment. All participants reported normal or correct-
ed-to-normal vision and were naive as to the purpose of
the experiment. The study adhered to the Declaration
of Helsinki and was approved by the ethics committee
of Humboldt University (Berlin).
Apparatus and stimuli
Stimuli were presented on a 19-in. CRT screen (1024
· 768 pixel resolution, 60-Hz refresh rate) that
observers viewed from a distance of 50 cm through a
custom-built mirror stereoscope, with their heads
stabilized by a head-and-chin rest. Throughout the
experiment, two frames (12.38 · 12.38) with borders
(width 0.58) consisting of random noise pixels (to
support binocular fusion) were presented side by side
on the black screen (distance between the centers of the
two frames 10.68), such that one frame was visible to
each eye. These frames enclosed a uniform white
background (11.38 · 11.38) against which all stimuli
were presented. Visual stimuli were presented with
Matlab (The MathWorks, Natick, MA) using the
Cogent 2000 toolbox functions (http://www.vislab.ucl.
ac.uk/cogent.php).
A total of 264 photo-realistic images of unique
nameable everyday objects were selected from three
different data bases (Brodeur, Dionne-Dostie, Mon-
treuil, & Lepage, 2010; Tarr, 2015; Viggiano, Vannucci,
& Righi, 2004). Objects were converted to grayscale, ﬁt
to a square (3.38 · 3.38, by scaling the longer axis), and
normalized for average luminance and root mean
square (RMS) contrast. We created split versions of
these intact objects by cutting them along the vertical
midline and swapping these halves. The resulting split
objects appeared to be cut in two halves (see Figure 1a).
Thus, while intact and split images contained identical
pixels, splitting distorted the holistic properties, not the
part-based aspects of the objects (Thoma et al., 2004).
A subset of 120 of the intact objects served as targets
in b-CFS. Targets had different relations to the
preceding critical primes, depending on the experi-
mental condition (see below). Of these 120 target
objects, 85 depicted nonliving objects, and 35 living
objects. The remaining 144 objects (107 nonliving, 37
living) were used as ﬁllers in the prime displays. To
induce interocular suppression, we created high-con-
trast, contour-rich CFS masks (4.88 · 4.88) consisting
of randomly arranged white, black, and gray circles
(diameter 0.28–1.08).
Procedure
The temporal sequence of a trial is illustrated in
Figure 1a. Trials began with a 1-s presentation of the
blank frames only, followed by the priming period in
which all stimuli were presented binocularly (i.e., all
stimuli were presented to both eyes, not inducing
interocular suppression), which was followed by the b-
CFS period where participants detected objects under
interocular suppression (Figure 1b). During the prim-
ing period, a small black ﬁxation dot was presented in
the center of the frames. During the b-CFS period, a
white ﬁxation cross with a black outline was centered in
the frames. Participants were instructed to maintain
stable ﬁxation during both periods. In the priming
period all stimuli were centered at 3.18 left or right of
ﬁxation, whereas in the b-CFS period all stimuli were
centered at 3.18 above or below ﬁxation.
The priming period began with a 2-s presentation of
the frames and the ﬁxation dot only. Next, a black
attentional cueing frame (4.88 · 4.88) was presented
either to the left or to the right of ﬁxation. After 66
ms, two object stimuli were presented simultaneously
for 150 ms to the left and to the right of ﬁxation, one
of them within the cueing frame. Depending on the
experimental condition, these primes could be both
intact, both split, or one of each. Participants were
instructed to covertly name the object shown in the
cueing frame and to press the keyboard key ‘‘Q’’ with
their left hand to indicate when they successfully
identiﬁed the attended object. A backward mask (4.88
· 4.88) consisting of random noise pixels shown for
450 ms followed the presentation of each of the two
prime images. Finally, the priming period ended with
a 2-s presentation of the frames and the ﬁxation dot
only to give participants sufﬁcient time for covert
naming and for pressing the corresponding key. The
proportion of trials with a button press reﬂecting
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successful identiﬁcation of the attended prime was
high for intact objects (M ¼ 92.1%, SD ¼ 5.4%), and
signiﬁcantly lower for split objects (M ¼ 71.6%, SD ¼
15.1%), t(29) ¼ 9.77, p , 0.001. This covert naming
task was implemented to ensure that participants
attended the cued object, tried to identify it, and
ignored the other prime. Naming tasks also have
previously been found to be more sensitive to view
changes in priming paradigms compared to other
types of tasks (Biederman & Cooper, 1991; Bruce,
Carson, Burton, & Ellis, 2000). Because the decision
to indicate successful object identiﬁcation and to press
the corresponding key is strongly dependent on the
observer’s criterion, in our main analysis we did not
exclude trials without a button press, but included all
trials in the computation of suppression times. For
consistency with previous research using naming tasks
(Thoma & Davidoff, 2006; Thoma et al., 2007; Thoma
et al., 2004) we conducted an auxiliary analysis in
which trials without a button press during the prime
period were excluded.
In the directly succeeding b-CFS period, an intact
target object centered above or below the ﬁxation
cross was gradually introduced to the participant’s
dominant eye. Simultaneously, CFS masks updated at
10 Hz were centered above and below the ﬁxation
cross in the frame presented to the participant’s
nondominant eye. The dominant eye was considered
as the eye with shorter mean suppression times in a
simple b-CFS experiment at the beginning of the
experimental session (Yang, Blake, & McDonald,
2010; 17 of our 30 participants were right-eye
dominant according to this method). To avoid abrupt
transients, over the ﬁrst 500 ms of the b-CFS period,
the target contrast was linearly increased from zero to
its original contrast while the target luminance was
linearly reduced from full white (as the background)
to its original luminance. Starting 2 s after the
beginning of the b-CFS period, the contrast of the
CFS masks was linearly reduced to zero over a period
of 7 s. Participants used their right hand to press the
up and down arrow keys on the keyboard to localize
the position of the initially invisible target. They were
asked to respond as quickly and accurately as possible
as soon as they detected an object or any part of it
either on the lower or upper half of the screen. The b-
CFS period ended either upon response or after a
maximum duration of 10 s.
Experimental conditions and design
The assignment of the stimuli to the different
experimental conditions was counterbalanced across
participants by placing the 120 target objects in ﬁve
different clusters, such that each target object ap-
peared in the ﬁve conditions equally often across
participants. Experimental conditions differed re-
garding the relation between one of the two objects in
the priming period, that is, the critical prime, and the
intact target object presented in the b-CFS period. The
conditions were (a) attended-intact (the target object
was attended in the prime display), (b) attended-split
(the target object was attended in the prime display,
but presented as its split version), (c) unattended-
intact (the target object was ignored in the prime
display), (d) unattended-split (the target object was
ignored in the prime display, and presented as its split
version), and (e) unprimed (the target object was not
presented in the prime display).
Participants completed two experimental blocks with
120 trials each (within a block, there was an additional
obligatory break after 60 trials), in which each of the
120 target objects was presented once. Within a block,
there were 24 trials per condition, and an equal number
of trials with the precue presented to the left or right of
ﬁxation and with the target appearing in the upper and
lower position. The critical prime was chosen according
to the counterbalancing across participants described
above, and the other object in the prime display was
sampled without replacement from the 144 ﬁllers. This
ﬁller object was intact in half of the trials and split in
the other half. In the unprimed condition, both objects
in the prime displays were ﬁllers (50% intact, 50% split).
Trial order was randomized. Before starting the
experiment proper, there were 10 practice trials using
another set of object stimuli.
Analysis
For the main analysis, trials with incorrect target
localization responses, trials without a localization
response, and trials with localization responses shorter
than 200 ms were excluded from the analyses of
suppression times (mean percentage of excluded trials
1.1%, SD ¼ 1.5%). For easy eyeballing of the overall
suppression times in seconds, Figure 2a shows mean
suppression times for the ﬁve experimental conditions.
For all statistical analyses, suppression times were log-
transformed (see Figure 2b) to account for their
positive skew. An auxiliary analysis was carried out in
a fashion analogous to previous work using naming
tasks (Thoma & Davidoff, 2006; Thoma et al., 2007;
Thoma et al., 2004). Following these previous studies,
one participant who was not a German native speaker
was excluded and trials in which participants did not
indicate having identiﬁed the prime (mean percentage
17.6%, SD ¼ 9.4%) were also excluded. Also for this
auxiliary analysis suppression times were log-trans-
formed.
Journal of Vision (2015) 15(3):15, 1–11 Stein, Thoma, & Sterzer 5
Results
Priming effects were computed as the differences in
log-transformed suppression times between the un-
primed baseline condition and the four priming
conditions. To test our hypotheses, we ran two types of
analyses. First, to test whether these priming effects
were signiﬁcantly greater than zero, one-tailed one-
sample t tests were conducted separately for each
priming condition. As can be seen from Figure 2b, in
the main analysis the priming effects were signiﬁcant
for attended-intact, t(29)¼6.40, p, 0.001, d¼1.17; for
attended-split, t(29) ¼ 4.90, p , 0.001, d¼ 0.89; for
unattended-intact, t(29)¼ 3.10, p¼ 0.002, d¼ 0.57; and
for unattended-split, t(29) ¼ 2.63, p ¼ 0.007, d¼ 0.48.
Thus, the presentation of a visible prime that was
related to the target presented under CFS resulted in
shorter suppression times relative to the unprimed
condition. This priming effect on the conscious
detection of intact objects occurred even when the
primes were split and unattended.
The auxiliary analysis on the trials with successful
prime identiﬁcation analysis yielded a similar pattern of
results. One-tailed one-sample t tests revealed signiﬁ-
cant priming effects for attended-intact, t(28)¼ 5.95, p
, 0.001, d ¼ 1.10; for attended-split, t(28) ¼ 5.40, p ,
0.001, d¼ 1.00; for unattended-intact, t(28)¼ 2.89, p¼
0.004, d¼ 0.54; and for unattended-split, t(28)¼ 2.63, p
¼ 0.033, d ¼ 0.36.
Second, we analyzed these priming effects using a
two-way repeated-measures ANOVA with the factors
prime attention (attended, unattended) and prime
intactness (intact, split). Only the main effect of
attention was signiﬁcant, F(1, 29)¼ 21.07, p , 0.001,
gp
2¼ 0.42, with larger priming effects for attended
primes (Figure 2). The main effect of prime intactness
did not reach signiﬁcance, F(1, 29)¼ 2.34, p¼ 0.137, gp2
¼ 0.08, meaning that intact and split primes were
similarly effective in facilitating access to awareness for
intact target objects under CFS. The interaction
between attention and intactness did not approach
signiﬁcance, F(1, 29)¼ 1.55, p¼ 0.223, gp2¼ 0.05,
indicating that attention enhanced priming effects from
intact and split objects to a similar extent.
The auxiliary analysis, including only the trials with
successful prime identiﬁcation, conﬁrmed these ﬁnd-
ings. There was only a signiﬁcant main effect of
attention, F(1, 28)¼ 26.54, p , 0.001, gp2¼ 0.49, but no
signiﬁcant main effect of prime intactness, F(1, 28) ¼
1.04, p ¼ 0.316, gp2 ¼ 0.04, and no signiﬁcant
interaction, F(1, 28)¼ 0.27, p¼ 0.610, gp2 ¼ 0.01.
Discussion
The current study was designed to test whether high-
level object representations facilitate the simple detec-
tion of an object and whether object detection relies on
perceptual mechanisms similar to those previously
found to underlie object recognition. For this, we
measured priming effects on the conscious detection of
objects using a b-CFS procedure. Relative to an
unprimed baseline condition, suppression times for
objects that were preceded by a related prime were
signiﬁcantly shorter. The general advantage of primed
stimuli compared to nonprimed stimuli in overcoming
Figure 2. (a) Mean suppression times in seconds for all five conditions. Error bars represent 95% CIs for within-subjects designs. (b)
Priming effects, that is, the differences in log-transformed suppression times between the unprimed condition and the four priming
conditions. Circles represent data from individual participants, horizontal bars show means, and vertical error bars show 95% CIs.
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CFS is in line with recent studies that found shorter
suppression times for primed stimuli (Costello et al.,
2009; Lupyan & Ward, 2013). To establish what kind
of object representation could mediate such facilitation,
we manipulated visual attention and object intactness,
that is, the holistic conﬁguration of an object,
according to the hybrid model by Hummel (2001).
When an object received spatial attention, it greatly
enhanced the priming effect measured as facilitated
access to awareness. The strong effect of attention on
priming is consistent with work showing that the
beneﬁcial effect of prior target-related information on
visual awareness is not only driven by passive, bottom-
up stimulus processing, but also strongly modulated by
the observer’s top-down set (Gayet et al., 2013).
Interestingly, however, compared to the unprimed
baseline, even unattended primes reliably boosted
access to awareness. These reliable priming effects for
unattended primes indicate that object detection does
not necessarily involve high-level part-based object
processing, as such analytic object representations
require attention to bind parts into coherent objects
(Hummel & Biederman, 1992). Moreover, priming
effects did not depend on object intactness, neither for
attended nor for unattended primes. That is, awareness
of a target presented in the common intact view was
similarly facilitated by the same intact prime and by a
horizontally split prime. Thus, the part–whole conﬁg-
uration of the prime, which is partially distorted in split
objects, is not crucial for priming of object detection to
occur, suggesting that object detection is less dependent
on holistic representations than object identiﬁcation.
Together, these ﬁndings are further evidence that the
processes leading to detection of objects are at least
partly different from those needed for object recogni-
tion (Mack & Palmeri, 2010). Moreover, our data
indicate that the simple detection of objects relies on
representations of object features rather than analytic
or holistic high-level representations.
The approach of the current study was also
motivated by the hybrid model of object recognition
(Hummel, 2001) according to which the recognition of
attended objects involves both analytic and holistic
representations, whereas the recognition of unattended
objects involves holistic representations only. This
central tenet of the hybrid theory is supported by
evidence from studies on priming of object recognition
that used the same attention and part-whole conﬁgu-
ration manipulations as in the present experiment
(Thoma & Henson, 2011; Thoma et al., 2004). Because
splitting at least partially disrupts the holistic match
between the prime and the target, split primes are
thought to facilitate target recognition only through an
analytic, part-based representation. Indeed, for object
recognition, priming effects from intact objects are
larger than from split objects, indicating an additional
contribution from holistic object representations
(Thoma et al., 2004). In the present object detection
experiment, by contrast, access to awareness was
facilitated to a similar extent by intact and split primes.
The absence of an advantage for intact primes suggests
that holistic object processing (Bu¨lthoff & Edelman,
1992; Edelman & Intrator, 2003; Tarr, 1995) that is
partially disrupted by split images plays little role in the
initial detection of an object. This is consistent with
evidence from b-CFS studies showing that stimulus
inversion (i.e., rotating the image by 1808, thereby
distorting the spatial conﬁguration) has little inﬂuence
on the detection of familiar objects from a wide range
of categories (with the exception of human faces and
bodies, Stein et al., 2012, Zhou et al., 2010). Thus, the
perceptual mechanisms underlying the detection of
many familiar objects seem fairly robust to changes in
part–whole conﬁguration.
In principle, these ﬁndings could well be explained
by analytic, part-based object representations that are
robust to view changes (Biederman, 1987; Hummel &
Biederman, 1992). However, the literature on object
recognition suggests that such analytic representations
require attention, because split objects (Thoma et al.,
2004) as well as rotated images (Thoma et al., 2007)
prime the recognition of intact targets only when they
are attended. In fact, in the present experiment the
priming effects from attended objects were consider-
ably larger than from unattended objects. Nevertheless,
object representations based on (attention-dependent)
structural descriptions cannot be the only mechanism
involved in object detection, as we found that even
unattended split objects facilitated access to awareness
for a related intact target. Although this attention
manipulation has been shown to successfully draw
attentional resources to the spatially cued prime and
away from the unattended, ignored prime (e.g., Thoma
et al., 2004) this approach does not necessarily allow us
to fully exclude occasional ‘‘slippage’’ of attention to
the ignored prime. Previous studies sought to account
for a possible inﬂuence of slippage. For example, the
study by Thoma and Davidoff (2006, experiment 1)
used catch trials in which subjects were asked to name
the unattended prime: None of the 26 observers could
correctly name the unattended prime. Previously,
Stankiewicz, Hummel, and Cooper (1998) showed with
this paradigm that unattended objects prime themselves
in a probe display when shown in the same orientation
but not in a mirror-image version of itself. This priming
result could not be expected if attentional slippage was
assumed. In addition, in an fMRI study using the same
attentional and view (splitting) manipulation Thoma
and Henson (2011) found no signiﬁcant repetition
suppression effects for unattended objects in object
responsive lateral occipital cortex. We thus deem it
highly unlikely that occasional slippage of attention in
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prime trials to the unattended object can account for
our data.
Thus, attention-dependent analytic object represen-
tations are unlikely to fully account for priming of
object detection. How, then, could we characterize the
perceptual mechanism underlying the initial detection
of objects? One possibility is that priming from
unattended objects relies on a representation of a
‘‘shapeless bundle of features’’ (Wolfe & Bennett,
1997). Indeed, Wolfe and Horowitz (2004) suggest that
a number of features may be processed in parallel and
pre-attentively in order to guide attention to then allow
binding and recognition. An attention-related ampliﬁ-
cation of such simple representations of object features
may account for the additive effect of attention
observed in the present experiments. Whereas this
simple feature representation seems sufﬁcient for the
conscious detection of an object in the visual ﬁeld,
identiﬁcation, naming, and more elaborate object
processing demand higher-level object representations.
We studied these perceptual mechanisms underlying
conscious object detection by recording the duration of
perceptual suppression under CFS. While we here
interpret differences in suppression times simply as
reﬂecting differences in detection sensitivity, a number
of previous studies have implemented the b-CFS
paradigm to study unconscious processing under
interocular suppression (e.g., Costello et al., 2009; Jiang
et al., 2007; Stein, Senju, Peelen, & Sterzer, 2011; Zhou
et al., 2010). In several studies, unconscious processing
was inferred when a binocular control condition not
involving interocular suppression yielded smaller de-
tection differences than the b-CFS condition. We did
not include such a control condition, because the logic
of relying on a control condition to infer unconscious
processing in the b-CFS condition has recently been
challenged on empirical and theoretical grounds (Stein,
Hebart, & Sterzer, 2011; Stein & Sterzer, 2014).
Nevertheless, mere differences in conscious detection
could, in principle, be regarded as evidence that stimuli
were processed differentially before they were detected,
that is, unconsciously (Dijksterhuis & Aarts, 2003;
Gaillard et al., 2006). While this inferential step has
some face validity, it is neither commonly made nor
generally accepted in the literature (e.g., Labiouse,
2004). Only paradigms in which stimuli are rendered
permanently invisible are currently considered as
providing unequivocal evidence for unconscious pro-
cessing (e.g., Sterzer, Stein, Ludwig, Rothkirch, &
Hesselmann, 2014). We therefore take our ﬁndings
simply as evidence for the modulation of detection
mechanisms by the preceding primes.
One important challenge for future work is to test to
which extent ﬁndings obtained with the laboratory
technique of CFS generalize to object detection under
real-world conditions. For the purpose of the present
study, we decided to implement CFS because previous
studies have demonstrated that the b-CFS paradigm
represents a particularly sensitive measure of the
inﬂuence of priming and of conﬁgural or holistic
stimulus properties on visual detection. For example,
one of the most robust b-CFS ﬁndings is that upright
faces and bodies break suppression more quickly than
the same stimuli presented in inverted orientations,
despite all physical stimulus features being identical
(Heyman & Moors, 2014; Jiang et al., 2007; Stein, End,
& Sterzer, 2014; Stein, Hebart, & Sterzer, 2011; Stein,
Peelen, & Sterzer, 2011; Stein et al., 2012; Yang, Zald,
& Blake, 2007; Zhou et al., 2010). At the same time,
recent studies that used both b-CFS and other
detection paradigms to study object detection have
demonstrated comparable effects with b-CFS and with
attentional blink and standard masking paradigms
(Gobbini et al., 2013; Stein, Seymour, Hebart, &
Sterzer, 2014). We thus believe that the present results
likely generalize to other psychophysical techniques for
studying object detection. However, ﬁndings obtained
exclusively with these well-controlled laboratory tools
do not necessarily fully account for real-world world
perception. A promising avenue for future studies thus
consists in extending the present approach to real-
world stimuli, for example by studying top-down and
priming inﬂuences on object detection in natural scenes
(e.g., Reeder & Peelen, 2013; for a review, see Peelen &
Kastner, 2014).
In summary, the initial detection of objects can be
strongly inﬂuenced by prior visual information on the
object, and this inﬂuence does not seem to require high-
level analytic or holistic representations of the primed
object, and most likely not even representations of 3-D
parts. Whatever the exact nature of the features driving
the priming for detection, it is intriguing that even
unattended objects induced signiﬁcant priming. Apart
from providing insights into the format of visual object
representations mediating simple detection, priming
effects from unattended objects also rule out that the
effects obtained with the present paradigm were due
only to conceptual or name priming, which most likely
contributed to priming from spatially attended objects.
It is unlikely, however, that covert naming can fully
account for priming from attended objects. Even for
object-naming tasks, the dominant mechanism under-
lying the priming effect has been shown to be
perceptual in nature, whereas name priming exhibited
only a comparably small effect (Thoma et al., 2004).
Interestingly, previous work on object recognition
using a similar priming paradigm has also shown that
participants are not conscious of the identity of
unattended objects in the prime display (Thoma &
Davidoff, 2006). This raises the possibility that feature-
based object representations that govern visual priming
of object detection do not need to make contact with
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higher-level processes involved in object recognition
and naming. Future work could directly test whether
these priming effects can be obtained in the complete
absence of prime awareness (e.g., Barbot & Kouider,
2012).
In conclusion, the current data show for the ﬁrst
time that spatially unattended primes can facilitate
awareness of objects under CFS. In addition, our
ﬁndings indicate that the processes underlying priming
of object detection are different from those for object
recognition, as the former are equivalent for non-
holistic part conﬁgurations. Rather than relying on
complex holistic and part-based object representations,
the initial detection of an object seems to involve
representations of basic object features that can be
established pre-attentively but are strongly boosted by
voluntary spatial attention. Future research will have
to establish in more detail whether the locus of the
priming resides in the representation of simple low-level
features, the surfaces of an object, or its volumetric
parts (e.g., Hummel & Biederman, 1992).
Keywords: object perception, conscious detection,
visual awareness, continuous ﬂash suppression, priming,
attention
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